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Social regulations are laws to control activities
that may negatively impact the environment,
health, and safety. Without regulations, orga-
nizations may not take into account the full
social costs of their actions. Government
intervention is necessary to assure that workers
have adequate information about workplace
health and safety hazards and to impose cost
controls so that organizations do not exces-
sively pollute the environment (Gausch and
Hahn 1999). Nuclear regulations are a subset
of social regulations that deal with controlling
ionizing radiation exposure from radiation-
producing equipment and from radioactive
materials. Nuclear technologies overall have
an impressive safety record. The Three Mile
Island nuclear power plant accident in 1979
caused serious damage to the plant, but there
were no deaths or injuries to workers or to the
general public as a result of releases of radioac-
tive material to the environment. In contrast,
the Chornobyl accident in 1986 caused seri-
ous environmental and public health effects
because of deliberate inactivation of safety sys-
tems. This resulted in massive releases of
radioactive material to the environment from
a reactor with minimal containment capabili-
ties. Excellence in nuclear safety is due primar-
ily to the work of radiation safety professionals
and to a protection system that has kept pace
with the rapid technologic advancements in
electric power generation, engineering, and
medicine. The price of success, however, has
led to a regulatory organization and philoso-
phy characterized by complexity, confusion,
public fear, and increasing economic costs.
From 1980 to 2000, regulatory costs in the
nuclear sector have increased more than 250%
in constant 1995 U.S. dollars (Figure 1). 
Simplifying nuclear regulations without
compromising worker or public health and
safety would serve two purposes. First, costs
of regulatory compliance could be reduced
sharply, particularly when health and envi-
ronmental beneﬁts of risk reduction are ques-
tionable (Figure 2). For example, a 2000 U.S.
General Accounting Office (GAO) report
estimated public expenditures in excess of
$100 million to clean up radioactively conta-
minated soil at the Nevada Test Site to levels
less than 10% of the natural radiation back-
ground (GAO 2000). Allocation of limited
economic resources should be based on a
careful risk–beneﬁt analysis that reduces over-
all risk to maximize health and safety. 
Second, the current system of protection
leads to confusion, public fear, and difﬁculty
in public communication. For example, the
International Atomic Energy Agency estimated
that 100,000–200,000 women in Western
Europe had abortions based on their percep-
tion of harmful effects of the Chornobyl disas-
ter. In Greece, as in other parts of Europe,
many obstetricians initially thought it prudent
to interrupt otherwise wanted pregnancies. In
some cases they were unable to resist requests
from worried pregnant women. This fear
occurred despite the fact that doses were much
lower than necessary to produce in utero effects
(Trichopoulos et al. 1987). Although popular
fear of radiation has many causes, clearly the
belief that any dose of radiation may be harm-
ful (the current philosophic approach in regu-
latory decision-making) is a major inﬂuence. 
Three key nuclear regulatory areas should
be closely examined and modiﬁed to improve
regulatory effectiveness and efficiency. First,
the system of radiation protection should be
changed from a risk-based system to a dose-
based system. The International Commission
on Radiological Protection (ICRP) intro-
duced a risk-based system in 1977 as a solu-
tion to the problem of combining doses from
different sources. However, the system has
created more problems than it has resolved.
Second, the U.S. government should adopt
the modern metric system. Metriﬁcation will
facilitate international communication and
public understanding. Currently there are too
many dose-related quantities and units in use
in radiation protection. Third, a single inde-
pendent office is needed to coordinate
nuclear regulations established by federal
agencies and departments. Today, a dozen or
more federal agencies and departments have
nuclear regulatory responsibilities. Dose lim-
its and estimates of radiation risks vary
because agencies differ in their regulatory
approaches and protective strategies. The
resulting federal regulatory framework is
characterized by inconsistencies, overlaps, and
gaps in nuclear regulations (GAO 1994).
Nuclear Regulations Should Be
Dose-Based Rather Than 
Risk-Based
Regulatory organizations should structure a
practical system of radiation protection in the
simplest way possible and base it on sound
scientific assumptions in order to apply it
effectively and efﬁciently. However, establish-
ing such a system is difﬁcult because ionizing
radiations (e.g., alpha particles, gamma rays,
neutrons) have different radiobiologic proper-
ties, and tissues and organs have different
radiation sensitivities [United Nations
Scientiﬁc Committee on the Effects of Atomic
Radiation (UNSCEAR) 2000]. Because of
differences in patterns of energy deposition in
tissues, alpha particles and neutrons are bio-
logically more effective than gamma rays per
unit absorbed dose. Furthermore, doses from
internally deposited radionuclides that accu-
mulate in particular tissues (e.g., radon gas in
the lungs) cannot be added to whole-body
doses from external radiation exposure.
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bined into a single number that can be com-
pared to dose limits. 
To address this problem, the ICRP recom-
mended that levels of acceptable risk, rather
than dose limits, should be the basis for the
development of radiation safety standards
(ICRP 1977). This system was revised and
updated in the ICRP’s Publication 60 (ICRP
1991). In this new system, risks can be com-
bined into a single number, assuming that
risks from exposure to different radiation types
are independent and that risks should be equal
whether the whole body is irradiated homoge-
neously or nonuniformly (ICRP 1977). In this
system, appropriate tissue weighting factors are
used to account for differences in tissue-spe-
ciﬁc risks when the body is irradiated nonuni-
formly. The tissue weighting factor is the
proportion of the tissue-specific risk to the
whole-body risk. By this calculation, doses
from internally deposited radionuclides may be
added to doses from external sources to esti-
mate the total dose to an exposed individual.
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
(NRC) used this methodology as a basis for
the 1991 revision of its standards for protec-
tion against radiation (U.S. NRC 1991). 
Although this risk-based system allows for
the calculation of a single dose value for com-
parison with limits, there are serious problems
with its utility in radiation protection. First,
there is substantial statistical uncertainty in
the values of tissue weighting factors. The
ICRP recognized these uncertainties but, nev-
ertheless, assigned single values to these factors
to facilitate dose calculations. These factors are
based on risk estimates derived from popula-
tions exposed to high doses (> 200 mSv)
delivered at high dose rates (perhaps 100
mSv/hr and higher) but are applied to occupa-
tional situations that involve low doses (< 10
mSv) delivered at low dose rate (perhaps 1–5
mSv/year) (UNSCEAR 2000). Age, sex, other
host factors, and the shape of the dose–
response curve modify risk significantly. At
doses near natural background radiation levels
(approximating many occupational exposure
situations), the range of uncertainty in the life-
time radiogenic cancer mortality risk is large,
and the lower bound of uncertainty likely
includes zero (National Research Council
1990). Although assigning specific values to
tissue weighting factors facilitates calculations,
it is overly simplistic and fails to account for
the inﬂuence of known risk determinants. 
Second, risks may not necessarily be equal
when the whole body is irradiated as com-
pared to a nonuniform exposure scenario.
This is important when internally deposited
radionuclides concentrate in particular tis-
sues. Radiogenic lung cancer as a conse-
quence of radon gas exposure is an example
where the calculation of a whole-body equiva-
lent risk is inappropriate. Lung cancer is the
only known health effect of radon gas expo-
sure (National Research Council 1999).
Extrapolation of the lung cancer mortality
risk to a whole-body risk is not consistent
with epidemiology because radon does not
result in excess cancers in other tissues and
organs of the body. 
To be valid, the risk-based methodology
should be symmetrical. If the specific tissue
dose is multiplied by the appropriate tissue
weighting factor to obtain the equivalent
whole-body dose, then dividing the equivalent
whole-body dose by the tissue weighting fac-
tor should yield the speciﬁc tissue dose. In the
case of radon exposure, risk is limited only to
the lung; there is no equivalent whole-body
dose that results in the same risk. The
National Council on Radiation Protection
and Measurements (NCRP) has used the
ICRP risk-based methodology to determine
that radon gas accounts for two-thirds of the
total natural background radiation dose based
on a comparison of equivalent whole-body
doses from radon and from cosmic radiation
and terrestrial radionuclides (NCRP 1987).
Because radon gas has been linked only to
lung cancer, it is inappropriate to calculate
equivalent whole-body doses. Accordingly,
radon gas and its progeny should be consid-
ered separately from other natural background
radiation sources. In occupational settings
involving external and internal exposures, it
may not be possible to calculate a single dose
for the same reasons. 
Authoritative bodies such as the ICRP and
NCRP and standard-setting organizations
should consider adopting a dose-based system
of protection whereby each type of radiation
and source is considered separately. Doses
from external exposures and from internally
deposited radionuclides are considered and
calculated individually. To determine compli-
ance with dose limits, doses are calculated as a
fraction of the prescribed limit and summed
over all radiations and exposure scenarios (e.g.,
internal vs. external exposures) to determine if
the sum is less than unity (a unity rule). 
Standard-setting organizations should
establish an array of dose limits that incorpo-
rates differences in radiation types and tissue
radiosensitivities. The current risk-based
methodology is unsatisfactory because there is
no appropriate way of combining radiation
doses from internal and external exposures.
Further, application of tissue weighting fac-
tors is problematic because of the large uncer-
tainties in the values. Considerable discussion
is needed to develop dose limits for all tissues
and radiation types. Radiation and tissue
weighting factors may be used in the develop-
ment of dose limits, but there is no need to
use any quantity other than absorbed dose.
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Figure 1. Estimated costs of social regulations in
the nuclear power sector. Regulatory costs (in
constant 1995 U.S. dollars) have risen steadily.
Costs in 2000 are more than 250% higher than 1980
costs (Guasch and Hahn 1999). It is assumed that
regulatory costs in the nuclear power industry
account for about 7% of all social regulation costs
(Hopkins 1996).
Figure 2. Economic costs of risk reduction. Costs of reducing environmental and public health effects of ion-
izing radiation exposure can be enormous. (A) Shows the costs of environmental cleanup at the Nevada
Test Site (GAO 2000). Below 0.25 mSv/year (average natural background is ~ 1 mSv/year excluding radon),
the cleanup costs (dashed line) rise precipitously despite very small theoretical reductions in lifetime radi-
ogenic risk; the solid line assumes a lifetime cancer mortality risk of 5%/Sv (National Research Council
1990). (B) Shows the cost effectiveness of radon remediation in homes (Tengs et al. 1995). Below a radon
gas concentration of about 7 pCi/L (about 95% of U.S. homes have radon levels below this level), the costs
of averting radon-induced lung cancer mortality (dashed line) rise signiﬁcantly despite very small theoreti-
cal reductions in lifetime radiogenic lung cancer risk (solid line). The dashed line is derived from the BEIR VI











































)Absorbed dose is the appropriate quantity
because the radiation weighting factors and
tissue weighting factors are simply used as
dimensionless modiﬁers of absorbed dose. As
additional information about biologically
derived weighting factors becomes available,
regulatory agencies may modify dose limits as
appropriate. 
A dose-based system of protection simpli-
ﬁes the current system by depending only on
the absorbed dose to the whole body or to the
speciﬁed tissues. Absorbed dose is a quantity
measured directly. Dosimetry is accurate to
levels approximating 0.1 mSv, well within the
range of doses typically encountered in envi-
ronmental and occupational exposure set-
tings, and about 3 orders of magnitude lower
than doses associated with measurable health
risks (Mossman 1998). Incorporating weight-
ing factors into dose limits eliminates uncer-
tainties inherent in using tissue weighting
factors in the risk-based system. Dose limits,
by deﬁnition, have no uncertainty. 
The creation of a large matrix of dose lim-
its is an administrative rather than practical
problem. Regulatory decision-makers need to
consider carefully what weighting factors
should be used to address radiobiologic effec-
tiveness of different radiation types and
radiosensitivity differences in tissues and
organs. Once the dose limit matrix has been
established, practical implementation is rela-
tively straightforward by comparing individual
or population doses directly to relevant limits. 
Discussions of dose limits should consider
reference to natural background. A key rec-
ommendation of a 1999 international Airlie
House conference was that reference to nat-
ural background radiation should be included
in policy discussions on the regulation of
radiation sources delivering low-level radia-
tion (Mossman et al. 2000). Natural back-
ground radiation has been used frequently as
a standard for comparison with anthro-
pogenic sources of radiation exposure because
background radiation is the largest source of
human radiation exposure. The major sources
of natural background radiation are cosmic
radiation and primordial radionuclides
(including radon). 
Using natural background radiation as an
approach to setting radiation standards is not
new. Adler and Weinberg (1978) proposed
that the standard deviation of the average
annual natural background radiation level be
used as the exposure standard. They argued
that the health detriment of a small additional
anthropogenic dose would be undetectable
and acceptable. However, a limit of 0.20
mSv/year is unnecessarily restrictive. This is
similar to the 0.25 mSv/year dose limit estab-
lished by the U.S. NRC in its ﬁnal ruling on
radiological criteria for licensing termination
(U.S. NRC 1997). This is about 3 orders of
magnitude below doses associated with statisti-
cally signiﬁcant radiogenic health risks in adult
populations (Mossman 1998). Others have
proposed a less restrictive approach by recom-
mending the annual natural background level
rather than the standard deviation of the aver-
age annual level as a basis for setting standards
(Clarke 1999; Mossman 1998).
Natural background radiation has been
well characterized. Radiation levels vary by
geographic location and altitude and have
been measured with great accuracy. The gen-
eral public understands the natural radiation
background even though it is complex and
consists of multiple radiation sources. Dose
limits can be set as multiples and submultiples
of natural background radiation levels. Setting
an appropriate reference annual natural back-
ground radiation level for the purposes of
establishing population dose limits must take
into account global variability in the natural
background. In the United States levels may
vary by a factor of 2 or more, with the highest
levels in the Rocky Mountain region and the
lowest in the mid-Atlantic states. 
Epidemiologic studies of health effects in
populations living in high background radia-
tion areas show no increase in public health
effects that may be attributed to radiation
exposure (National Research Council 1990).
Certain high natural background radiation
areas such as Ramsar, Iran, have annual radia-
tion levels exceeding occupational exposure
limits (Ghiassi-nejad et al. 2002). Anchoring
dose limits to the natural background does
not preclude the use of cost–benefit analysis
and other tools in regulatory decision-making.
It would also diffuse the idea that any dose of
radiation is potentially harmful. As a conse-
quence, public health concerns associated with
environmental cleanup and radioactive waste
disposal might largely disappear.
Radiation Quantities and Units




The system of quantities and units used in
radiation protection is complex and cumber-
some. There are numerous dose-related quan-
tities (categorized as either dosimetric or
protection quantities) in use in radiation pro-
tection. Debate continues about the stability of
radiation protection quantities and units and
the appropriateness of protection quantities
such as equivalent dose. Recent name changes
in quantities have generated confusion within
the scientiﬁc and technical community and the
general public. The ICRP’s change from effec-
tive dose equivalent (ICRP 1977) to effective
dose (ICRP 1991) and the shift from dose
equivalent to equivalent dose has created chaos
in the nomenclature (Strom and Watson
2002). Furthermore, the same units are used
for multiple quantities. The sievert is a unit
common to both equivalent dose and effective
dose. Unless the speciﬁc quantity is identiﬁed,
use of sievert is problematic. The failure of the
United States to adopt the modern metric sys-
tem only adds to the confusion.
The radiation protection community
should give serious thought to simplifying the
system of radiation quantities and units. In a
dose-based system of protection, the dosimet-
ric quantity “absorbed dose” is the only one
needed. This assumes that differences in rela-
tive biological effectiveness and tissue radiosen-
sitivities are accounted for in the dose limits.
Protection quantities such as “equivalent dose”
and “effective dose” are not measured directly
and are not independent from absorbed dose
(Table 1). Since radiation and tissue weighting
factors are dimensionless, there is no need to
use other quantities to describe what is simply
a weighted absorbed dose. Radiation protec-
tion should be based on direct measurements
of absorbed dose because it is the energy
absorbed per unit mass of tissue that deter-
mines risk. However, for protection purposes,
the ICRP prefers to use the average tissue dose.
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Table 1. Radiation quantities and units.
Current system of measurement  Proposed system of measurement Comment
Many quantities to measure individual and population  Only a single quantity-absorbed dose  Absorbed dose, equivalent dose, and effective dose are not 
doses are in use including absorbed dose, equivalent  should be used. independent quantities. Absorbed dose is the only quantity
dose, and effective dose. that is actually measured. Equivalent dose and effective
dose are weighted absorbed doses. 
Modern metric and English units are in use in the  Only modern metric units (International  The U.S is the only industrialized country in the world that has 
United States  System of Units) should be used.  not ofﬁcially adopted the modern metric system. 
Effective dose is the quantity used for dose limits. Absorbed dose should be used for dose  Dose limits should incorporate radiation and tissue weighting 
limits. factors to account for differences in relative biological 
effectiveness and tissue radiosensitivity. The ICRP argues that the absorbed dose (cal-
culated at a point in tissue) is an unsatisfactory
predictor of risk because it does not account
for the average tissue dose or differences in tis-
sue radiosensitivity. The magnitude of the
average tissue dose depends on weighting fac-
tors and assumptions in dose models (ICRP
2001). These factors introduce large uncertain-
ties in the calculations. Because radiation risk
estimates have much greater uncertainties at
low doses delivered at low dose rates (National
Research Council 1990), it is unclear that
reducing the uncertainty in the dose estimate
by using average tissue dose will have any prac-
tical consequence. Accordingly, it is prudent to
adopt the simpler approach (using absorbed
dose) when alternative strategies are not likely
to improve overall protection. 
The refusal of the United States to adopt
the modern metric system continues to cause
communication problems, particularly in the
international arena. The United States is the
only industrialized country in the world not
officially using the modern metric system.
Because of its many advantages, including
easy conversion between units of the same
quantity, the modern metric system has
become the internationally accepted system of
measurement units. The U.S. government
should adopt it with the gray (Gy) as the fun-
damental unit of absorbed dose. The NRC
has already initiated an effort to use the met-
ric system. Since 1993, the agency has pub-
lished new regulations, regulatory guides, and
other agency documents in dual units
(English system and modern metric system)
to facilitate use of modern metrics by
licensees (U.S. NRC 1996). This is not a per-
fect solution, but it is a worthwhile effort to
get licensees and others to use the metric sys-
tem. By doing so, the United States will align
itself with the rest of the world. As the
Chornobyl accident clearly demonstrated, we
need to think globally rather than locally
about radiological health and safety.
The Regulatory Framework Should
Be Reorganized within the Federal
Government
The U.S. government has recognized the
need for a comprehensive program to coordi-
nate control of all sources of ionizing radia-
tion in the federal sector for more than 40
years (Morgan et al. 1959). Differences in
radiation limits, risks, and protective strate-
gies reﬂect a historic lack of a uniﬁed frame-
work for radiation protection (GAO 1994).
In 1959 President Eisenhower created the
Federal Radiation Council (FRC) to advise the
president on matters of radiation safety and to
provide general standards and guidance to help
protect the public health from radiation haz-
ards. The FRC came about because of public
concern over radioactive fallout and its public
health consequences as a result of atmospheric
weapons. The FRC was composed of members
from different federal agencies and depart-
ments. Their different views and the FRC’s
lack of binding authority over other agencies
severely limited the council’s effectiveness. 
In 1970 the FRC was abolished, and fed-
eral guidance authority was transferred to the
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).
The intent was to place many of the environ-
mental functions of the federal government
into a single federal agency. However, after
abolishment of the FRC there was no formal
effort to coordinate nuclear regulatory respon-
sibilities among all federal agencies and
departments charged with nuclear regulatory
responsibilities.
In 1984, the Committee on Interagency
Radiation Research and Policy Coordination
(CIRRPC) was established and chartered
under the Federal Coordinating Council for
Science, Engineering and Technology, Ofﬁce
of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP),
Executive Ofﬁce of the President. Its overall
charge was to coordinate radiation matters
among federal agencies and departments, eval-
uate radiation research, and provide advice on
the formulation of radiation policy. Like the
FRC, the CIRRPC often reflected discord
among agency representatives. The CIRRPC’s
effectiveness was seriously compromised by
the lack of appropriate authority to provide
effective policy coordination among agencies. 
A 1994 GAO report concluded that effec-
tive coordination of regulatory programs was
lacking (GAO 1994). The CIRRPC’s inability
to forge consensus on acceptable radiation
risks and to coordinate regulations among
agencies led to its demise. The Interagency
Steering Committee on Radiation Standards
(ISCORS) replaced the CIRRPC in 1994.
ISCORS is composed of federal agencies that
facilitate consensus on acceptable levels of
radiation risk to the public and workers. It is
co-chaired by the U.S. EPA and the NRC and
promotes consistent risk approaches in setting
and implementing standards for protection
from ionizing radiation. The committee aims
to foster early resolution and coordination of
regulatory issues associated with radiation
standards. However, ISCORS lacks both a
reporting line and binding authority over fed-
eral agencies and departments.
The U.S. EPA continues to retain presi-
dential federal guidance authority. Federal
guidance is a set of guidelines developed by
the U.S. EPA for use by federal and state
agencies responsible for protecting the public
from the harmful effects of radiation. The
U.S. EPA develops guidelines for the presi-
dent’s review and approval. 
The 2000 GAO report (GAO 2000) on
continuing differences between the U.S.
EPA and the NRC over resolution of issues
associated with cleanup of licensed sites
strongly suggests that the same problems that
hampered the effectiveness of the FRC and
the CIRRPC continue with ISCORS. The
U.S. EPA and the NRC have duplicative
oversight of nuclear energy facilities. Because
of the inability of the agencies to resolve dif-
ferences, the GAO recommended congres-
sional intervention (GAO 2000). Congress
(U.S. House of Representatives 1999) has
directed the two agencies to develop a mem-
orandum of understanding. Such a memo-
randum was signed by the U.S. EPA on 30
September 2002 and by the NRC on 9
October 2002 (U.S. EPA 2002). 
A single, independent ofﬁce is needed to
oversee nuclear regulations established by fed-
eral agencies. Centralization and coordination
of regulatory programs is necessary because of
inconsistencies, overlaps, and gaps in the
nuclear regulatory framework. At present at
least a dozen federal agencies with different
enabling legislations have nuclear regulatory
responsibilities. The 1999 Airlie House con-
ference concluded that consistent and coher-
ent radiation policy on the national level is
necessary for the effective implementation of
radiation safety (Mossman et al. 2000). One
solution is to create a central ofﬁce within the
OSTP. It would work closely with, but sepa-
rate from, the recently established Office of
Information and Regulatory Affairs to coordi-
nate nuclear regulatory decision-making
among federal agencies. The office would
facilitate the establishment of a coherent,
comprehensive, and integrated system that
avoids overlapping and conflicting regula-
tions. A key to the success of this OSTP
office would be the transfer of the federal
guidance authority from the U.S. EPA and
binding authority over federal agencies and
departments with nuclear regulatory responsi-
bilities. The ineffectiveness of the FRC, the
CIRRPC, and ISCORS can be traced directly
to the absence of these authorizations. 
Creating a uniﬁed regulatory framework by
establishing a central coordinating ofﬁce will be
challenging. The effectiveness of such an ofﬁce
will depend on identifying competent adminis-
trative and technical staff and resolving agency
turf battles and jurisdictional controversies. The
U.S. EPA is not likely to relinquish federal
guidance authority without a ﬁght unless the
agency receives appropriate compensation, per-
haps in the form of authority to expand existing
radiation programs and support for new initia-
tives. Agencies and departments are not likely
to agree to a broad requirement for external
approval of regulations by a central ofﬁce unless
they are guaranteed that agency autonomy and
regulatory decision-making will be conserved. 
In restructuring nuclear regulations, a use-
ful model to consider is the Federal Common
Rule for the protection of human subjects
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and Human Services 1991). This rule essen-
tially establishes a set of common regulations
in each federal agency and department.
Creation of a comprehensive federal nuclear
regulatory policy using a common rule model
would facilitate coordination of regulations by
focusing on areas of common responsibility
including worker and public health and safety. 
ICRP Review of Current System of
Radiation Protection
The ICRP is reviewing its system of radia-
tion protection and developing new recom-
mendations that will replace the 1990
recommendations (ICRP 2001). The ICRP
Main Commission is now considering what
it views as a simpler approach to radiation
protection based on an individual-oriented
philosophy. The principal change involves
emphasis on the dose to an individual from a
controllable source. This represents a shift
from the utilitarian philosophy emphasizing
societal-oriented criteria that are the basis of
the current framework. However, it is unclear
that diverting completely from a utilitarian
perspective simplifies radiation protection.
The proposed radiation protection framework
is still unnecessarily complicated. The dosi-
metric and protective quantities introduced in
the 1990 recommendations (ICRP 1991) are
slated for retention, but the next recommen-
dations will clarify differences in quantities.
The ICRP admits that the current set of radia-
tion and tissue weighting factors is more com-
plex than can be justiﬁed, and the next set of
recommendations will attempt to simplify the
weighting factors (ICRP 2001). The proposed
system also introduces a complex generalized
structure of individual doses linked to protec-
tive actions. The various protective actions are
linked to levels of concern (called “bands”)
that are deﬁned in terms of multiples and sub-
multiples of the natural background radiation
dose (ICRP 2001). The ICRP should give
serious consideration to simplifying quantities
used in radiation protection. The proposed
use of submultiples and multiples of the nat-
ural background as a basis for protective
actions is a sound basis for developing a sys-
tem of dose limits based on natural back-
ground radiation levels. 
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